A coopetitive-dynamical game model for currency markets stabilization

David Carfì, Francesco Musolino


The aim of this paper is to propose a dynamical methodology to stabilize the currency markets and at same time to address, indirectly, the Credit Crunch phenomenon. We adopt Game Theory and, specifically, the new mathematical model of Coopetitive Game proposed in literature by D. Carfi' with some its associated dynamical aspects. Our idea is to save the Euro (or other currencies) from speculative attacks, by introducing a currency transactions tax. Specifically, we focus on a real economic operator - our first player -  and on an investment bank - our second player. The unique solution that allows both players to gain something, and therefore the only one collectively desirable, is represented by an agreement, between the two subjects, on the division of the maximum collective gain. Finally, we propose also a possible division of gains (even more advantageous than the previous one) in a coopetitive context, where the two above economic subjects use a loan by the European Central Bank (ECB), to obtain a greater gain.


Currency Markets; Financial Risk; Financial Crisis; Games; Speculation; Coopetition

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1478/AAPP.931C1

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