There can be many ways of understanding and defining truth, but everyone agrees that the search for truth, at least in one of its meanings, is a specific feature of human beings.

If someone disagrees, they can still join the call and explain why.

For everyone else, the main questions we intend to address in this first issue of ETR are the following:

-       human nature and moral truth

Moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, according to which “good” is equivalent to “performing well a natural function”.  Thus, in the case of human beings, we can use notions such as “natural end”, “moral flourishing” and “moral truth”. Ethics is not simply something relative to cultures, costumes, individual preferences: it has an objective core, rooted in a descriptive element of human being as such. Can there be any other conception of “moral truth”, apart from that of moral naturalism?

-       human nature and religious truth

Christianity, Islam, Judaism and many other religious systems claim to possess and reveal the definitive truth about God, the world, and human beings. Is this religious belief a need of human beings, in line with the concept of “natural religion”? On the other hand, can the eventual coherence between a religious anthropology and what we know from science and psychology about human beings be a criterion to establish the truth of a religion?

-       human nature and scientific truth

The search for a solid and shareable knowledge is a basic element of science. Can there be any scientific research without the regulatory ideal (i.e. the orienting objective) of truth? On an epistemological and theoretical level, how can we distinguish between truth and scientific objectivity?

-       the truth of human nature

The meaning of “nature” is hard to be ultimately defined, but speaking about “human nature”, in general, entails the idea that there are some elements which are common to all human beings, of every time and place. The very concept of “human nature”, therefore, seems to open up the possibility that there may be “certain and justified knowledge” about ourselves. What arguments can be developed, today, for or against this statement?